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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Democradura or dictablanda? (1) 
The shortcomings of transitional governments, previously democratic transitions, 
are legion, hence President Putin¹s attempt to reshape the political landscape in 
Russia seems less Dadaism than neo-Realism; we¹ve seen something like it 
before.  For Russian political analyst Georgi Satarov, whether the leader is 
Yel¹tsin or Putin, whether the goal is democracy or dictatorship, there is one 
common element:  weakness.   ³The rule of Yel¹tsin and the rule of Putin are 
distinguished by different political trends and a common result.  Yel¹tsin 
established a weak democracy; Putin is seeking to establish a weaker 
dictatorship.  Both have led to disorder and confusion.²  (2) 
 
Satarov¹s analysis is starkly simple:  ³A strong dictatorship needs either a uniting 
and appealing idea or powerful officialdom.²  (3)  The collapse of communist 
ideology—even in its late lip-synching phase—left an ideological vacuum, which 
Putin has been unable to fill with his personal machismo.  Nor has nationalism 
managed, thus far, to cement Russian statehood.  Strong officialdom (AKA 
apparatchiki or political technologists), were kept off balance by Yel¹tsin¹s teeter-
totter regime and Putin has been slow to remove the detritus of the Yel¹tsin-era 
bureaucracy. While several well-known names have moved on to the ³private² 
sector, some among them seem to have remained notably close to the Kremlin 
flame.  (For a discussion of the remarkably stable roster of personalities at the 
governmental level, please see The NIS Observed, Vol. IX, No. 4)   It is, 
however, Putin¹s obvious inclination to staff the halls of the Kremlin and the 
White House with former security services officers that makes a resurgent state 
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the odds-on favorite scenario.  There is one seemingly fatal flaw in this plan:  The 
post-Soviet security services are suffering from the same malady contracted by 
most other post-Soviet institutions – a lack of public confidence brought on by 
incompetence.  Anxiety about resurgent security services, given Russian and 
Soviet history, was clearly rational, but Beslan (and Qatar, et al) has 
demonstrated chinks in the armor.  
 
Putin¹s move ³to strengthen the power vertical,² coming in response to Beslan, 
looks less like a crackdown than a tactic to circumvent challenges the authorities 
are not able to control (e.g., terrorism, infiltration of the borders, corruption) 
through channels that they currently can control (i.e., the political environment via 
a withered opposition and legislative branch).  As such, Putin¹s Russia looks 
more and more like dictablanda, a soft dictatorship, with strongly centralized 
formal authority but little coercive power and no ideological zeal.  Call it neo-
Brezhnevian.  
 
Presidential seal of approval 
President Putin recently signed an interesting piece of legislation:  The Duma 
adopted and the Federation Council approved amendments to Article 11 of the 
Constitution to permit government office holders also to lead political parties.  
Putin¹s signature of this new bit of constitutional law is likely to solidify a ³party of 
power² in government, but may also provide a new shade of veneer as leaders of 
allegedly ³opposition² parties take up posts in Putin¹s ³inclusive² government. (4) 
 
President Putin also recently appointed Aleksandr Glazkov as acting governor in 
the Astrakhan region.  To quote the decree, ³Aleksandr Pavlovich Glazkov has 
been appointed acting governor of Astrakhan Region to perform his duties until a 
newly elected governorŠtakes office.²  (5 -- emphasis added)  When would that 
be?  
 
Emergency restructuring 
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In accordance with the President¹s decrees on reforming the government 
administration (most recently, the July 11 decree), the Emergencies Ministry 
announced that it has disbanded its Information and Public Relations Directorate.   
The press service of the Ministry now will be responsible for communicating 
Ministry information to the media.    According to the report, the Emergencies 
Ministry is to come into compliance with the reform-based new ³manning table² 
that sets out a total administrative staff of 825 employees, which includes 140 fire 
safety officials and 250 members of the Civil Defense Forces, but does not 
includes security personnel.  (6)  The Ministry structure now includes three 
deputy ministers, a chief military expert, a head fire safety inspector, a nineteen 
member board, eleven departments and eight directorates. At the regional level, 
the total personnel level of local ministerial bodies is not to exceed 26,900.   (7) 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
A bid to define national security needs 
According to the current Secretary of the Security Council, Igor Ivanov, the 
Sovbez is preparing to draft a new national security concept.  Again.  Ivanov held 
a public forum at Moscow State University on November 3 to invite discussion of 
the wording of the document.  Of course, the Sovbez presumably has been 
engaged in the process of drafting a new security concept since October 2002, 
when Putin requested a revision of the existing concept in light of the Nord-Ost 
Theater attack.  (8) 
 
In September 2004, following the Beslan hostage taking, Ivanov initially 
announced the reworking of the security concept, which he noted was now 
³demanded by life itself.²  (9)  Among the areas of increased concern:  the 
struggle against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation.  
 
While a dictatorship does not require truly effective security services, but merely 
those perceived to be so, it seems unlikely that Putin¹s siloviki minions are 
making an overwhelmingly favorable impression.  The security services needed 
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to be prepared for acts of terrorism – Chechen, international or a mix thereof – if 
not after Budennovsk or Kizlyar, then certainly after Nord-Ost.  Perhaps, outside 
the Security Council chamber, they have formulated methods of protecting the 
state, however, the announcement of a public meeting to discuss the proper 
wording of a national security document that should, it seems, be drafted and 
implemented by security services professionals certainly does nothing to inspire 
confidence, instill fear or support for a democracy, dictatorship or hybrid. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Democradura and dictablanda refer to ³neither here nor there² transitional 
conditions:  democracies with suppressed civil and voting rights or ³soft 
dictatorships² with a formal centralization of authority. 
(2) Novaya gazeta, 4 Nov 04 via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL)#8442, 5 Nov 04. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Interfax in Russian, 1916 GMT, 3 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1103 via World 
News Connection. 
(5) Interfax in Russian, 1859 GMT, 3 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-2000-1103 via World 
News Connection. 
(6) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey in English, 1512 GMT, 1 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-
2000-1101 via World News Connection. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) RIA-Novosti, 3 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
(9) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
Speaking to the State Duma late last month, Federal Security Services (FSB) 
Director Nikolai Patrushev outlined what appears to be part of his response to the 
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task laid before him last July—the specific structures that will make up a 
reformed FSB, geared toward implementing the federal government¹s response 
to terrorist acts.  He recommended the creation of a command center that would 
coordinate the efforts of all participating sections of government and the civilian 
sector during an event such as another Beslan-style siege involving hostages.  
The FSB, along with the Defense and Interior Ministries, has developed an 
additional initiative to set up regional command centers, as well to monitor and 
analyze situations in their respective regions, develop response plans, and to 
coordinate the responses of all participating parties.  The federal and regional 
command centers would work together, as required; however, an important 
element of this initiative is the special authority the regional command centers will 
have to organize and execute a response to a terrorist event.  (1)  This plan 
appears aimed directly at one of the major shortfalls highlighted most recently by 
the Beslan siege:  the apparent lack of command and control and communication 
with on-scene authorities.  By creating permanent federal and regional response 
centers, tasked with developing response plans and coordinating them, and 
given the authority to execute them without the requirement to wait for specific 
authorization from the Kremlin, the power ministries will have taken a major step 
forward in combating the threats Chechen separatists seem intent on bringing to 
Russia proper. 
 
Recognized in this recommendation is the requirement for legislative changes 
that will enable tougher responses to terrorist events, not just the decentralization 
of response authority, but new prosecution and punishment rules and standards. 
(2) Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev has also recommended tightening entry 
requirements into Russia in an attempt to enhance border security and minimize 
the corrupt practices that have allowed instigators passage into and out of the 
country.  (3)  Drawing significant criticism, Russian Prosecutor-General Vladimir 
Ustinov suggested ³use of the help of the relatives of terrorists by the law 
enforcement agencies during special operations.²  (4)  This was interpreted in the 
Duma and the media as a request for legal leeway to take the relatives of 
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hostage-takers hostage to assist in the release of civilians.  Variously assailed as 
state-sponsored terrorism, a return to Nazi tactics and an overwhelming abuse of 
human rights, it is not clear that this legal change will be pursued further.  (5) 
 
On the same day that many of these proposed changes were announced, 
regional authorities carried out a counter-terrorism exercise in front of media at a 
military training facility near Novocherkassk in the Rostov region, although it is 
not clear that the announcement and the exercise were purposely coordinated.   
However, this exercise demonstrated, in highly scripted form, exactly how the 
government would respond, in an idealized situation, to the next hostage-taking 
event.  In this exercise, approximately 1,500 troops from the FSB and Interior 
Ministry special forces, Civil Defense, Emergency and Defense Ministries, and 
police fell under the command of Russian Army Colonel Vladimir Afonin to 
respond to a gang of 30 hostage-takers who had simulated the takeover a 
village.  This regional ³tactical team² responded with full force, and executed all 
the procedures with the efficiency one might hope such a team would possess, 
including, somewhat surprisingly, on-scene negotiations (over a loudspeaker for 
demonstration purposes) with hostage-takers to gain more time and a pair of 
helicopters delivering a landing team to engage the hostage-takers and take 
prisoners.  The whole event took no more than an hour to conclude with a 
minimum of simulated friendly casualties and included a display of all the latest 
weaponry and tools.  (6) 
 
This demonstration appears to have highlighted all the elements for the lack of 
which the government was criticized during the Beslan siege:  a quick and 
coordinated response with representatives from all necessary branches of 
government under the command of one competent leader; real-time 
communications across this force; well-practiced actions, restraint and 
negotiation until the last possible minute; and the ability to make decisions on the 
scene, rather than waiting for word from the authorities in Moscow on what to do 
next.  Indeed, if the government could guarantee such an effective response to 
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terrorist attacks, no doubt popular perceptions of security in Russia would be 
significantly enhanced.  
 
However, there are limits to the lessons one can draw from such a sleek and 
highly staged event.  For one thing, Rostov Deputy Governor Viktor Usachev told 
reporters that such tactical command teams operate throughout the country, 
headed by ³the senior deputy chairmen of the regional counter-terrorism 
commissions,² but it is not clear that they are all as well-manned and regionally 
responsive as they appeared during this demonstration.  Of course, southern 
Russia, in and around the region where this demonstration took place, has been 
the scene of quite a number of such terror attacks, so if this response is 
repeatable in real time, the government should be lauded, but it is somewhat 
bewildering that this capability could have been created in a scant two months, 
as it was clearly not available during the first days of September in North Ossetia.  
Also, it is unlikely all the tactical teams that do exist are as well equipped as 
demonstrated here.  It is also somewhat disingenuous to show such a tidy 
conclusion after so short a time, without demonstrating how such a force could 
respond to a much longer-lasting event—will troops operate 12 hours on/12 
hours off to stay sharp?  Are there first-responders scattered across the regions 
to buy time for the rest of the force?  Will they be able to operate effectively at 
night (indeed, would that not give them an advantage over hostage-takers)?  This 
last question may be the most enlightening as night scopes for rifles cost 
upwards of a million rubles each.  Evidently, the press were also left with many 
unanswered questions during a media conference that preceded the exercise. (7) 
 
While the coordination between the public discussion in Moscow and the 
demonstration in the Rostov region is itself impressive, in addition to the 
coordination demonstrated during this exercise, there is a higher level of 
coordination not demonstrated here that has already been highlighted—the 
ability to prevent such events.  Earlier in October, Lieutenant General Yevgeni 
Abrashin, deputy Commander of federal interior troops in the North Caucasus 
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region, wrote an opinion piece for Izvestiya discussing how terrorists were able to 
set up several successful attacks in Russia this year (Grozny, Ingushetia, and 
Beslan) and what could have been done (and could be done in the future) to 
prevent such attacks.  Not surprisingly, he highlighted the security services¹ 
tendency to fail from acting on the most basic information (not the nuanced 
human intelligence from deeply-inserted spies, but practically common 
knowledge in the area, including known movements of large bands of militant 
groups), to refrain from reinforcing poorly-manned units in areas of known 
militant activity, to neglect the need for increased attention at specific border 
entry points when necessary, and to fail coordinating federal and regional forces.  
He did not even mention corruption as a contributing factor in these events.  He 
did emphasize the fact that ³in August 2004, all areas of the Southern Federal 
District set up permanent command-and-control groups to combat terrorism,² 
presumably referring to the capability demonstrated by the Rostov exercise, but 
blamed the Interior Ministry for not setting such groups up in Ingushetia and 
North Ossetia, where they could have been very useful. (8)  (Usachev claimed 
that such groups existed everywhere except Chechnya and Astrakhan¹, regions 
populated already with significant numbers of troops.) 
 
While both Duma presentations and scripted counter-terrorism exercises are 
useful advances, only the next terrorist attack will provide an adequate measure 
of the Russian government¹s true intent to attempt reforming its counter-terror 
capabilities and the actual capability this intent engenders.  Clearly, at least one 
tactical command unit exists, with access to adequate response equipment, but it 
remains to be seen if there are enough of these units across the country or if 
these can respond where needed in time.  Furthermore, all these units need 
good equipment, from basic body armor to the high-technology tools like night-
vision equipment that can give government forces the tactical edge over 
terrorists, but, as demonstrated during the Beslan siege, even the elite FSB and 
Interior Ministry special forces units are not equipped adequately today.  (9)  The 
400 billion rubles that law enforcement and security services are slated to receive 
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may help relieve the shortfall, but much of it is already earmarked for other 
necessities, including wages, housing, and education.  (10) 
 
And while all of these plans serve to enhance President Putin¹s tarnished 
reputation as the guarantor of peace in Russia, only the next step will truly make 
Russia more secure—using these and other forces to prevent terror attacks 
before they occur, even if it means no headlines or lively television footage.  
Duma meetings and hour-long firefights make for good theater, but the best 
theater in the war on terrorism is very boring, ensures that such events never 
happen.  It doesn¹t bode well for the security services, and their leaders, that 
they tend to demonstrate their capabilities publicly. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Russian FSB Head Calls For Creation of Counterterrorism Center, New 
Legislation,² Itar-TASS, 29 Oct 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-1029 via World News 
Connection. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) ³Russian FSB, Interior Ministry Prepare Plan on Crisis Prevention, Handling,² 
Itar-TASS, 29 Oct 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-1029 via World News Connection. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 8, No. 206, Part I, 1 Nov 04. 
(6) ³Russian South Hosts Anti-Terror War Game,² RIA Novosti, 29 Oct 04 via 
Lexis-Nexis and ³Counter-Terrorism Exercise Takes Place,² by Arkadi Yuzhny, 
Gazeta, 1 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) ³Unforgivable Mistakes:  A General Speaks Out About Russia's Failures in the 
Caucasus,² by Yevgeni Abrashin, Russia Profile, 20 Oct 04 via Johnson¹s Russia 
List, #8421, 22 Oct 04. 
(9) The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX Number 15, 29 Sep 04. 
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(10) ³Anti-Terror Expenditures May Be Clarified by Third Reading of Budget,² 
Moscow Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 20 Oct 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-1020 via 
World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Stumbling blocks to peace? 
Tensions remain high despite the 5 November negotiations in Sochi between the 
Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and the South Ossetian leader Eduard 
Kokoity, in the presence of the Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Valeri 
Loshchinin.  They were supposed to create the necessary conditions for the 
eventual settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. 
 
In fact, expectations prior to the negotiations were more realistic and dependent 
on whether ³Russia will give a positive signal to Kokoity who is under its 
influence.² (1)  In an interview with Novaya gazeta¹s Anna Politkovskaya, 
Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution, Georgy Khaindrava discussed the 
results of closed-door talks in Moscow between himself, Georgian Parliamentary 
Speaker Nino Burdzhanadze, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the 
Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Igor Ivanov. Russia paid lip service to 
the concept that the territorial integrity of Georgia presupposes that Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are Georgian regions. (2) Mr. Khaindrava emphasized that 
Georgia has all rights to the Rok Tunnel and that it was evident that Georgia¹s 
rights have been infringed upon. According to Khaindrava, Georgia would grant 
as much autonomy to S. Ossetia as North Ossetia enjoys within Russia, and that 
in effect, one was not dealing with distinct North and South Ossetian people – 
there are only Ossetians who live in Russia and Ossetians who live in Georgia. 
(3) 
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Following the negotiations between Zhvania and Kokoity, a statement 
disseminated by the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that all illegal armed groups 
must be withdrawn from the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone by 20 November. 
Only peacekeeping forces (present since 1992) are to remain in the zone. (4)  
Mr. Kokoity claimed that during the talks, the Georgian side acknowledged their 
responsibility for conflicts last summer and that South Ossetia was forced to take 
defensive actions. (5) Georgian Deputy State Security Minister Batu Kutelia, 
confirmed only that the sides ³discussed the demilitarization of the conflict zone, 
joint control over hills in the zone and establishment of joint control over the 
Roksy tunnel.² (6) Tbilisi¹s commitment to retaining its territorial integrity was not 
to be undermined by the negotiations. Zhvania reaffirmed this commitment by 
stating, ³I explained to the representatives of the Ossetian and Russian sides that 
the main aim of the Georgian government is to restore the integrity of Georgia. 
This is the main thing we¹re fighting for and we¹ll certainly reach it.² (7)  
 
During the course of the meeting, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili held 
his own press conference at which he claimed that Georgia would not allow itself 
to be provoked into any kind of confrontation or large-scale conflict in the 
Tskhinvali region. (8) His commitment has been tested by the recent alleged 
kidnappings of Georgians by South Ossetian forces and an explosion that injured 
a Tbilisi news crew that occurred a day after the Sochi negotiations. According to 
Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Irakli Okruashvili, these events are ³being 
used as a means to goad the Georgian side into a reckless situation.² (9) The 
Georgian population has been urged not to give in to any such provocations, and 
parties on both sides have agreed to join in efforts to search for the missing, one 
in particular, a resident of Agabeti, Georgy Kakhniashvili, who went missing 3 
November and is believed to be held by the Ossetians.  Some Georgian 
retaliation for the kidnappings occurred when ten Ossetian residents were taken 
hostage on 5 November, though there are plans for their release. The Ossetians 
have released 32 of 50 or so ³hostages,² though Mr. Kakhniashvili was not one of 
 12 
them. (10) Representatives of the mixed peacekeeping contingent present in the 
region are conducting a search for Mr. Kakhniashvili. 
 
Mr. Kokoity, commenting on results of the meeting, claimed, ³Zurab Zhvania 
belongs to that group of Georgian politicians who support the peaceful settlement 
of the conflict and I think we¹ll seek all possibilities to release those people who 
were taken hostage² adding however, that South Ossetia does not intend to 
make concessions over its status. (11)  With neither side willing to concede their 
ultimate intentions in the region – the Georgians desire for territorial integrity and 
the South Ossetians claims of independence these talks and even the current 
tensions may represent progress on the road to peace, not just with each other, 
but with Russia.  Russia¹s intentions with regard to Georgia are unclear, 
particularly following the events in Beslan. Hostilities in the region provide Russia 
with an advantage as mediator, one that enables it to influence policies and 
arrange for outcomes that are to Moscow¹s advantage. As the Georgian-
Ossetian conflict simmers, Russia¹s true desires, whether for peace or for 
something less benevolent, may become more evident. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol 
On 5 November, President Vladimir Putin ratified the Kyoto Protocol on global 
warming.  The United States and Australia, among others, rejected the treaty¹s 
ratification and thus Russia was the only country left whose signature could clear 
the way for the treaty to take effect next year. (12) The decision to ratify the 
treaty was made in September and the Russian Parliament voted to ratify the 
protocol on 22 October, but these decisions did not occur without extensive 
internal debate among Russian officials. 
 
The debates were centered on whether Russia¹s ratification would benefit or 
harm the Russian economy. According to Vsevolad Gavriolov, Deputy Director of 
the Economic Development and Trade Ministry Department, the protocol itself 
will not harm the Russian economy; it depends on Russia¹s own actions whether 
 13 
it will benefit the country. (13)  For success within the context of the treaty, 
Russia needs to ³make the Kyoto Protocol¹s mechanisms a natural continuation 
of the country¹s internal policy.² (14) Proposals have been made to implement 
the protocol successful in two stages. The first would be to offer support for 
industry operators who are willing to restrict greenhouse emission limits on their 
own accord; the second, well into the future, assumes that Russian national 
procedures have been aligned with those in the protocol, and the decision that 
remains is whether to make the obligations binding and compulsory. (15) 
 
Though the ramifications may be unknown, it is apparent that Russia¹s decision 
to sign the treaty opens it to greater international cooperation and pride in the 
fact that the Kyoto Protocol could only take effect because of Russia¹s 
participation. 
 
Arafat, Russia and the Middle East 
With Yaser Arafat¹s rapidly declining health, Russia¹s role in the Middle East 
peace process has the chance to change. Potentially, Arafat¹s decline could 
propel Russia to assume a greater role in implementing the ³Road Map,² which it 
signed in 2003, along with the United States, the U.N. and the European Union. 
Russia also could take a more neutral stance than it has In the past. 
 
President Putin¹s relationship with the newly re-elected President Bush could be 
an asset, as Russia has aligned itself with strong anti-terrorist U.S policies, 
though this type of alignment could also be seen as detrimental in the region. 
Russia¹s ties with both the large number of Russian-speaking émigrés in Israeli, 
and its support for the Palestinians could truly work to an advantage, giving 
Russia the chance to play both sides. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Novaya gazeta, 4 Nov 2004; No.82, p.20; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) RIA Novosti, 6 Nov 04, via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(5) RIA Novosti, 6 Nov 04, via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) The Messenger, 8 Nov 04; 
(www.messenger.com.ge/issues/0736_november_8_2004/news_0736_1.htm). 
(8) RIA Novosti, 6 Nov 04, via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(9) The Messenger, Ibid. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) The New York Times, 6 Nov 04; 
(www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/international/europe/06kyoto.html?th=&pagewant
ed). 
(13) RIA Novosti, 5 Nov 04, (en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm?msg_id=5055540). 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
If you can¹t take the news, don¹t read the paper 
³I simply wanted to read every copy of that paper, and I paid for all of the copies 
with my own money. I can show you the receipt,² said acting Prefect Alla 
Revazova in her explanation of why she seized copies of Ekran Vladikavkaza 
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that contained an article criticizing North Ossetia¹s President Aleksandr 
Dzasokhov. (1) 
 
The article was a reprint of a piece by Konstantin Chedzhemov, an outspoken 
member of the opposition, criticizing Dzasokhov for the massacre in Beslan. The 
article was printed initially in Sotsial-Demokrat Alanii, a paper with a circulation of 
3,000, which remained undisturbed at newsstands for a week, indicating that the 
confiscation by government officials may have had more to do with the reprint¹s 
wider distribution of about 7,700. The same day those papers disappeared from 
kiosks, Sergei Burnatsev, editor-in-chief of Ekran Vladikavkaza, was notified that 
he would have to vacate the property where the editorial offices are currently 
located – the Iristonskiy municipal district prefecture. 
 
This incident, along with the recent revocation of the license of the newspaper 
Angusht in Ingushetia for publishing a list of persons who had been killed, 
wounded, or had disappeared in the last few years, (2) highlights several of the 
problems with media ³freedom² in Russia. (Angusht earlier had reprinted an 
article from Novaya gazeta – a paper registered at the Russian Ministry of the 
Press – by Anna Politkovskaya, criticizing Russia¹s policy toward Chechnya. For 
this it received a warning from M. M. Kalimatov, the prosecutor and senior justice 
advisor of the Republic of Ingushetia.) (3)  The Russian Federation actually 
possesses fairly sound media laws, originally drafted in 1991. These laws outline 
the rights of journalists, prohibit censorship, and detail the registration process. 
For example, the law confirms the right of journalists ³to visit specially protected 
places of natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes, mass disorders and 
mass gatherings, and also localities where a state of emergency is declared.² (4)  
The problem lies in the application and enforcement of the law (or lack thereof). 
 
During the events in Beslan, a number of journalists were detained or hassled by 
the police and the Federal Security Service. Some journalists, among them 
reporters for Novye izvestia and Moskovskie novosti, were detained by police 
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asking to see passports, accreditation certificates, and North Ossetian 
provisional registration documents. Other journalists, Anna Politkovskaya and 
Nana Lezhava, allegedly were poisoned while attempting to cover the hostage 
taking. (5) If the rights of Russian journalists have any meaning, these incidents 
should be followed up and investigated. 
 
The media law currently is undergoing revision. The Ministry of Culture and Mass 
Communications, the Agency for Press and Communications, and the Industrial 
Committee are developing a draft of a new media law, expected to be ready by 
the end of this year. 
 
The draft involves several points of contention, among them the inclusion of the 
Internet in the law as a form of media, the question of normative censorship, and 
the inclusion in the new law of the word ³owner² in addition to/or in place of 
³founder.² 
 
Use of the Internet in Russia (the Runet) boomed in 2003, at one point reflecting 
as many as 350,000 new users a month. (6) Current levels recently surpassed 
the 15 million mark of persons who have used the Internet at least once in the 
last six months. (7) Although Internet usage is heavily concentrated in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg and is hampered by the low bandwidth capability of phone 
lines, the Internet is growing as a viable means of spreading information. For 
instance, Anna Politkovskaya¹s article that led to the Angusht a warning from 
authorities was posted subsequently on the Internet as an alternative source. (8) 
 
Those in charge of drafting the new law are divided concerning the issue of the 
Internet. Senior Deputy Culture Minister, Leonid Nadirov, says the law should 
include the Internet. (9) The Chairman of the Duma¹s Information Policy 
Committee, Valeri Komissarov, advocates regulating online publications, but 
acknowledges the drawbacks of regulating the entire World Wide Web. ³If we 
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were to shut down the .ru domain, for example, which many sites use, they would 
all just switch to the .com domain site.² (10) 
 
Komissarov expects licensing requirements to apply to online publications, the 
definition of which could become complex. What qualifies as publishing? Is there 
a distinction between publishing and posting information? How is such a law 
enforced? 
 
The Deputy Minister of Information Technology and Communications Ministry, 
Dmitri Milovantsev, disagrees with Nadirov and Komissarov. He says the Internet 
should not be considered part of the mass media. (11)  It remains to be seen 
which elements will prevail. 
 
The issue of censorship has also arisen with the new law. Alexander Kotenkov, 
Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian president at the Federation 
Council and head of the commission for information policies at the Federation 
Council, says the new law should include ³normative² censorship, providing 
explicit legal norms on what may be covered. (12) 
 
That a representative of the president is advocating censorship raises concerns 
in a country whose media already are affected by a great deal of self-censorship, 
a tendency that increased after the 2002 Dubrovka attacks, when the authorities 
threatened to pass laws regulating media coverage of terrorist attacks. The result 
was the Antiterrorist Convention developed by the Industrial Committee and 
signed by representatives of the media. The conventions are voluntary, but 
nevertheless are observed by the media. Indeed, coverage of Beslan skated a 
treacherously thin line between lamenting the event and ensuring avoidance of 
criticism concerning the authorities¹ response to the situation. Even so, some 
politicians are lobbying for regulations prohibiting the media from covering 
terrorist events supposedly for the sake of protecting the nation¹s psyche. (13) 
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Self-censorship notwithstanding, the Russian Television Academy awarded 
several honors to canceled political shows, sending what analysts agree 
amounted to a message protesting government pressure on the television 
industry in Russia. Awarded shows included the canceled NTV programs 
³Freedom of Speech,² ³Namedni,² and ³Krasnaya strela.² (14) 
 
It appears that the lack of diligent protection of journalists¹ rights, coupled with 
the failure to follow through on suspicious actions by the authorities, and the 
voluntary self-censorship of the media, already amount to a form of normative 
censorship. As for protecting the nation¹s psyche, it is the citizen¹s decision 
whether to read the paper or not, and the media¹s job to provide balanced and 
accurate reporting. The role of the authorities is simply to enforce the laws 
protecting the journalists¹ rights to pursue and provide information. 
 
The third issue concerns the inclusion of the word ³owner² in the new law. FC 
Deputy Speaker Dmitri Mezentsev, who works on information policy-related 
issues, recently commented that the new law ³must protect copyright and 
intellectual property and will not only do that but will also make provisions to curb 
unfair advertising and dirty tricks. The new media law, of course, must become 
an instrument for fight [sic] against those organizations that have made terror a 
tool for obtaining money.² (15)  One wonders if media owners who permit their 
reporters to print critical articles will be subject to charges of using terror as a tool 
for obtaining money. 
 
Protest at last 
Public political action was visible in Moscow on October 23, when more than 
2,000 persons congregated to protest the Chechen War. The seemingly small 
turnout was over four times what the organizers had anticipated. (16) 
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The protest was coordinated by For Human Rights and the Committee for Anti-
War Activities with support of Committee 2008. The speakers also decried the 
increased role of the security services under Putin and the rising number of 
politically-motivated criminal cases. 
 
Score: Mothers 1, Putin 0 
The Union of Committees of Soldiers¹ Mothers will meet with Aslan Maskhadov, 
possibly in November, to discuss the war in Chechnya. The New York Times 
published an appeal by the Union in October. Akhmed Zakayev responded to the 
message on Maskhadov¹s behalf. The subject and details of the meeting have 
not yet been determined. (17) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Local paper pays price for criticizing North Ossetian president,² BBC 
Monitoring, 22 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) ³Editor in Russia¹s Ingushetia denies printing of Œextremist¹ material,² BBC 
Monitoring, 26 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) ³Ingush editor hits out at attacks on press freedom,² BBC Monitoring, 20 Oct 
04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) ³Chapter V: The Rights and Duties of the Journalist,² accessed 3 Nov 04 via 
(http://www.internews.ru/law). 
(5) ³Special operation in Beslan a success: Operation against journalists,² 
Novaya gazeta, 20 Sep 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) ³Internet use skyrocketing in Russia,² accessed 3 Nov 04 via 
http://www.gcis.ca/n-aa/cdne-514-may-30-2003.html. 
(7) ³Over 15 million Internet users in Russia,² RIA-Novosti, 3 Nov 04 via 
Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL) #8439. 
(8) ³Ingush editor hits out at attacks on press freedom,² BBC Monitoring, 20 Oct 
04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(9) ³Self-censorship,² What the Papers Say (WPS), 7 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 20 
(10) ³If censorship is introduced, we would have a different country,² WPS, 20 
Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) ³Self-censorship,² WPS, 7 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) ³Envoy says media law should envisage Œnormative censorship¹,² ITAR-
TASS, 6 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1006 via World News Connection. 
(13) ³Duma official says antiterrorism steps must not restrict media freedom,² 
Moscow RIA-Novosti, 19 Oct 04: FBIS-SOV-2004-1019 via World News 
Connection. 
(14) ³Russian media elites honor canceled shows to protest pressure on TV,² 
FBIS Report, 18 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1018 via World News Connection. 
(15) ³Russia¹s FC to discuss concept of new media law Wednesday,² ITAR-
TASS, 6 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) ³2,000 call for end to Chechen war,² St. Petersburg Times, 26 Oct 04 via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(17) ³Woman, don¹t be silent,² Kommersant, 21 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
In a report released on 20 October, the New York-based group, Human Rights 
Watch, shines a light on one of the uglier problems facing Russian officials.  The 
report outlined the culture of abuse that exists primarily among the conscripted 
force in the Russian military.  According the report, virtually institutionalized 
dedovshchina, or ³rule of the grandfathers,² exposes hundreds of thousands of 
new recruits in the Russian armed forces during their first year of military service 
to grossly abusive treatment at the hands of more senior conscripts. (1)  The 
report claims that dedovshchina exists in military units throughout the Russian 
Federation and that ³[w]hile dedovshchina may once have served the purpose of 
initiation, it has in the past twenty years degenerated into a system in which 
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second-year conscripts, once victims of abuse and deprivation themselves, enjoy 
untrammeled power to abuse their juniors without rule, restriction, or fear of 
punishment.² (2)  It concludes that ³abusive practices associated with 
dedovshchina have persisted due to an almost universal failure on the part of the 
officers¹ corps to take appropriate measures² and accuses Russian leaders of 
having largely ignored the problem. (3)  Along with making a number of other 
specific recommendations, Human Rights Watch called on Russian leadership, 
starting with President Putin, to take a firm and clear stance against 
dedovshchina. (4)  
 
The report appears to make conclusions that are not entirely supported by the 
data.  The group¹s research consisted of interviews with persons concerned in 
cases involving only 100 conscripts.  These cases had to do with conscripts from 
50 bases across 25 of Russia¹s 89 provinces over a two year time period. (5)  
The horror stories documented are substantial enough not to be discounted, but 
they hardly appear to constitute a scientific sampling that can be used to draw 
conclusions about the entirety of the Russian military and its readiness.  In this 
time period, more than 600,000 conscripts were inducted into the Russian armed 
forces.  Despite making statements such as ³even when conscripts complain 
about their treatmentŠmilitary officials were wholly uninterested in investigating,² 
(6) the report made no mention about the fact that the Main Military Prosecutor¹s 
Office had tried more than 1,500 cases this year and convicted more that 3,200 
servicemen (over 400 of them officers) on charges of abuse or physical violence.  
In 2003, 3,500 cases were tried and 3,400 servicemen (500 officers) were 
convicted. (7) 
 
The Defense Ministry¹s response to the report was predictably defensive, yet 
appeared somewhat persuasive.  The official response from the Defense Ministry 
was posted on the Human Rights Watch website and cited these facts: 
 
 22 
For a number of years the crime rate in the armed forces has been 2-2.5 times 
lower than the overall national level. During 2002, 2003 and 2004, 90% of units 
experienced no dedovshchina, and 80% had no violations whatsoever. The fact 
that hooliganism in the barracks does not take place on a massive scale is also 
proven by the findings of Human Rights Watch¹s rights-defenders, who found 
only 100 victims of dedovshchina in the 3 years of research, and on whose 
statements they rely for their report. (8) 
 
Just as in many situations when analyzing matters Russian, using government 
numbers, statistics, or other facts is problematic due to a lack of transparency 
and inability to validate the data.  The reality is that dedovshchina is just one of 
several debilitating problems facing the Russian military.  The author of the 
Human Rights Watch report claimed during a recent press conference that 
³Štens of thousands of families every year² have tried to ensure their sons are 
not called up due to their fear of dedovshchina. (9)  The reality is that the system 
of deferments, which allows the vast majority of draft-eligible young men to avoid 
service and reduces the conscription pool to the sludge of society, has evolved 
over more than a decade.  During this time period the army could not feed, 
shelter, clothe or provide medical care for its troops and was engaged in bloody 
fighting in Chechnya.  Funding of the military is still so poor that Russia¹s 
lieutenants get paid only about $150 a month and nearly a third of the 165,000 
officers do not have apartments. (10)  According to Viktor Litovkin, in an article in 
RIA novosti, ³The situation with rights of the militaryŠcan be changed only when 
everyone, from privates to generals, starts treasuring service in the army.  
Without it there is no army.² (11) 
 
The Defense Ministry agrees wholeheartedly.  Its formal response to the report 
ended with this conclusion: ³The final solution of the problem depends directly on 
the level of prestige of the military service and on the level of moral, 
psychological and physical readiness of the young generation for service in the 
army and awareness of its public and political significance. And this is the field 
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for the activities of such an important instrument as mass media affecting the 
authorities, the minds and hearts of people, as well as for different non-
governmental organizations and movements and society as a whole.² (12)  To 
this end, proposals for reinvigorating the program of patriotic education were 
discussed at a recent conference in Moscow.  A large gathering from the various 
regions, government ministries and departments, and leading social 
organizations heard proposals to spend more that 669 million rubles to organize 
patriotic education.  The military has asked that 406 million rubles from its budget 
be allocated towards the effort. (13) 
 
The government¹s strategy for bringing order to the military has several points of 
attack.  First is to fix what officials perceive as the public relations problem, 
illuminated above.  The authorities apparently are pursuing two courses of action 
to address this issue.  Not only will they engage in a program of patriotic 
education in order to encourage young people to want to serve in the armed 
forces, but also, in typical Soviet fashion, they will attempt to silence groups who 
would speak disparagingly about the army.  The notorious ³Black Colonel² State 
Duma Deputy Viktor Alksnis announced that he will ask the Justice Ministry and 
Prosecutor-General¹s Office to investigate the Soldiers¹ Mothers Committee.  
According to Alksnis, that organization conducts an ³anti-army campaign with 
Western money.² (14)  The security services have been following the Soldiers¹ 
Mothers groups and claim to have ³data to prove that they are financed by the 
West and are conducting subversive work against the Russian Armed Forces.² 
(15)  The Human Rights Watch report, which was written with extensive 
assistance from various Soldiers¹ Mothers groups, even quotes Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov as asking questions about the purpose of the groups: ³One other 
thing that concerns me are the runaways, sometimes hundreds of kilometers, to 
so-called committees of soldiers¹ mothers... In fact, there are hundreds of such 
committees, or even thousands. Who supports them, how they live, that remains 
a big question.² (16)  
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The second branch of Ivanov¹s strategy to return order to the military is to 
continue the conversion to a professional, contract force, reducing the reliance 
on conscripts to fill the force.  The bad news here is that units fully converted to 
contract servicemen have shown comparable moral weaknesses to those noted 
in the conscripted force.  The program for conversion to contract servicemen still 
suffers from being under-funded.  The poor pay and general lack of infrastructure 
attracts and satisfies only low quality recruits.  Statistics show that crime rates in 
contract units actually are higher than in similar units comprised of conscripts. 
(17)  The 76th Airborne Division has demonstrated additional evidence of the 
lack of discipline in the contract forces.  Barracks that were commissioned only 
two years ago for this unit already are in need of refurbishment because, 
according to the Russian Deputy Defense Minister in charge of construction and 
billeting, Col-Gen Anatoli Grebenyuk, ³hotheads among the paratroopers like to 
show bravado, reducing furniture, doors and washrooms practically to 
smithereens.² (18)  And although Ivanov has claimed repeatedly that no 
conscripts will serve in Chechnya, he is referring only to Ministry of Defense 
forces there.  The Interior Troops¹ 46th Brigade will be manned by only 33% 
contract servicemen by the end of the year. (19)  Other military units will still be 
populated by conscripts, including construction troops, border troops, and other 
security services units. 
 
Finally, in a recent interview, Ivanov has stated that ³a modern military is not all 
about troop strength – it¹s primarily about technology.² (20)  Questions regarding 
the soundness of this assertion notwithstanding, on this issue his efforts are likely 
to fall short as well.  According to a recent analysis, Russian military expenditure 
on armaments is not modernizing the military but instead devoted to upgrading 
old hardware.  The analysis claims that of the 300 samples of new weaponry and 
technology promised in 2005, the reality is that most of these weapons are 
refurbished or updated versions of previous systems. (21)  Because the military 
industrial complex was placed virtually on starvation rations by the defense 
budgets of the past ten years, it has relied almost exclusively on sales to foreign 
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governments.  In order to maintain cash flow, elites in the military industries have 
focused on upgrading late Soviet models to meet the immediate needs of foreign 
customers.  As a result of privatization, the industry¹s design bureaus were 
separated from production units, inhibiting enterprises from being capable of 
capitalizing on technological advances. (22)  For this reason, one of Russia¹s 
premier defense manufactures, Sukhoi, will not be capable of producing its fifth 
generation fighter aircraft until 2013, while the U.S. already is producing F-22¹s 
and, by 2010, will be producing the Joint Strike Fighter. (23) 
 
The road to soundness for the Russian armed forces undoubtedly will require 
that it pass through a period marked by even more downsizing.  Political forces 
are likely to render impossible improving the quality of the conscripted force.  
Fiscal constraints will continue to delay conversion to a contract force of any size.  
Attempts to modernize will be limited by corruption and a devastated military 
industrial complex.  In the meantime, it appears that Russian officials will 
continue to attempt to find forces in the West to blame for this condition. 
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EXTERNAL 
Russia's Naval Future 
Almost 15 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia is still looking to 
reform its military, specifically its Navy, into a 21st century force.  The 
transformation of the Soviet Navy into the Russian Navy has been slow and 
essentially without direction.  Russian political and military leaders have not 
forged any useful reform plans that take into account the current economic 
realities, instead preferring to hold on desperately to the vision of the Soviet blue 
water Navy.   
 
President Yeltsin failed to provide the Navy with any firm guidance regarding its 
role in the future of Russian security, let alone fleet disposition or composition 
requirements.  He was much more concerned with solidifying power and 
strengthening the economy.  His economic measures resulted in a severely 
reduced budget for the Navy.   It was not until after NATO's operation in 
Yugoslavia and the Kursk disaster, that President Putin signed a directive On 
Russia's Maritime Activity and an associated document entitled, "The 
Foundations of Naval Policy of the Russian Federation Until the Year 2010."  In 
July 2001, President Putin approved the Naval Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation for the period up to 2020.  Both of these documents are extremely 
vague and do not provide the Navy with any specific requirements.  The 
documents have been characterized as nothing more than "a wish to return 
Russia to the world ocean before other powers divide its riches." (1) 
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Last week at EURONAVAL 2004, the 5th International Naval Force Equipment 
Exhibition, held in Paris, Russian Presidential Aide Aleksandr Burutin uttered the 
truism, "a concept outlining further development of the Russian Navy is a serious 
issue." (2)  During his interview with ITAR-TASS, he openly pondered the 
question, "Should Russia have ocean-going aircraft carriers with the necessary 
support ships or (should) the Navy be (focused on) accomplishing missions in the 
Russian sea zone?" (3)  "We have to know precisely what kind of Navy we'll have 
by 2015, even by the year 2025 if we take into account the long period of 
construction of serious naval equipment. We should adopt the necessary 
programs of fleet development and follow them accurately," Burutin said. (4) 
 
The idea of a long-term naval acquisition strategy is not new to Russian 
politicians.  In 1976, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov 
said, "the long time needed to create the material and technical resources for a 
Navy, the relatively short service life of ships and the associated danger of the 
obsolescence of naval forces place special demands on science, which must 
indicate the course of naval construction years and even decades in advance." 
(5) 
 
Russian naval history 
Russian state security has rarely, if ever, been threatened from the sea and, 
therefore, the Russian Navy has never been considered a vital element in state 
security.  Perceived threats and antagonists in the Baltic and Black Seas led to 
the development of a Navy in the 17th and 18th centuries.  Naval development 
was sustained by the view that a Navy is a symbol of great power status and 
imperial expansion, but the Russian Navy never achieved more than a secondary 
status compared with its predominantly land focused military. 
 
The Soviet Union retained Russian naval traditions and expanded the Navy¹s 
role within the military.  The Navy was seen as an example of Soviet economic 
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and scientific power.  The USSR, boasted the highest naval potential in the mid-
80s – with 62 nuclear-powered guided-missile giant submarines of strategic 
designation, over 400 nuclear-powered and diesel-driven universal submarines 
and over 700 surface ships in its service.  These numbers were always padded 
due to Admiral Gorshkov hesitance to decommission any ships.  
 
The Soviet Navy did have numerous problems.  One, with lasting effects for the 
current Russian Navy, was its choice of ship designs.  Instead of copying NATO 
ship designs, the Soviet leaders wanted their Navy to comprise a new, original 
trend in the development of the navies of the world.  So, the Soviet Navy was 
designed as an offensive force – to fight large World War II style naval battles at 
sea against NATO forces.  Admiral Gorshkov stated that the primary mission has 
to "successfully oppose a strong enemy Navy and repel his attacks from 
seaward." (6)             
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Navy lost numerous key 
bases on the Black, Baltic and Caspian Seas, several major shipyards beyond 
the confines of Russia, and the majority of non-Russian personnel.  The rate of 
decommissioning grew immensely while the rate of warship construction fell 
dramatically.  With no need for the offensive power inherent in Soviet surface 
ship design, a severe lack of funding, and limited basing, the Russian Navy was 
rendered useless except as a coastal force. 
 
Russian threat perception and the utility of a Navy in future wars 
Russian threat perception, especially among its naval leaders seems to be stuck 
in the Cold War.  Admiral Vladimir Valuyev, Commander of the Baltic Fleet, 
commented on Russian television: "Every nation, including Russia, must seek to 
strengthen its armed forces and its Navy.  It will prove useful.  If NATO behaves 
peacefully, we'll stick to peacetime tasks. If, however, the situation is escalated, 
we'll always be ready to take appropriate action." (7)  For naval leaders, the 
rhetoric also displays a type of self-preservation; if the Russian Navy does not 
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have NATO and the U.S. as enemies, then it could be justified only as a large 
coast guard. 
 
Russian threat perception, outside of the Navy, would likely include, in varying 
degrees, the United States, NATO and NATO expansion, the People's Republic 
of China, Islamic Fundamentalism and terrorism, and Japan.  Russian forces are 
active in Chechnya, Georgia (Abkhazia, Adjaria, South Ossetia), Moldova, 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  Additionally, protection of Russian citizens 
and suppression of separatism in many autonomous Republics, autonomous 
oblasts and other regions present a perceived, if not real, security concern.  In 
surveying this list, Russia's perceived threats and security concerns are almost 
exclusively land oriented with the exception of the United States and NATO.  
With Russia's threat perception and current economic position, it does not seem 
that the Navy is in a position to win the competition for scarce military resources.  
 
Putin and Kuroyedov 
President Putin and the Russian Navy have been friends for a long time.  As 
Deputy Chief of the presidential administration in 1997, President Putin served 
on the military council of the Navy.  Within months of Putin¹s appointment in 
1997, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov replaced Admiral Felix Gromov as the Navy¹s 
Commander in Chief.  The President attended the defense of Admiral 
Kuroyedov¹s doctoral thesis, which has become the basis for the Foundation and 
Policy papers of 2000 and 2001. 
 
Admiral Kuroyedov appears to be much more savvy than his predecessors or his 
other service contemporaries.   He seems to be able to fuse President Putin¹s 
political arguments into his military strategies.  In his maritime strategy essay 
(morskaya strategiya), he maintained that Russia¹s maritime strategy should help 
it achieve practical results in the shortest possible time; almost the exact the 
same words were used in Putin¹s argument that Russia¹s first task is improving 
its economy. (8) 
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Admiral Kuroyedov has suggested a much more progressive ship building 
strategy, unlike his predecessors¹ demands to counter the U.S. and NATO ship 
for ship.  He has suggested developing new combat systems that are capable of 
adjusting or flexing to disrupt enemy operations.  He has suggested additionally 
that the Navy should no longer be required to maintain its global presence, but 
has made numerous contradictory statements on this point.  In the same 
maritime strategy essay, he promoted the idea that the threat from the sea is 
global and Russia requires a blue-water, balanced Navy to counter the threat. 
 
Admiral Kuroyedov was approved for a one-year extension past the mandatory 
retirement age earlier this summer.  His extension will allow him to have the 
primary input as the Navy concludes its bidding and design contest for 
construction of long-range oceanic combatants.  He will also be able to approve 
the design of new joint interoperable weapons, capable of being adapted to all 
ships of all projects.  Both design contests will be complete before the end of the 
year.  
 
Conclusion 
Russia¹s defense spending cannot support a big, blue water Navy, so the 
Russian leadership has only two options.  It can allow the Navy to continue its 
decline into obsolescence or transform the Navy into a smaller, less personnel 
intensive, high tech force, which is interoperable with Russia's current ground 
and air forces and capable of interacting with regional associations, other naval 
powers and the United Nations. 
 
Due to financial constraints, Russia will continue to scrap her older ships and 
submarines, retaining only those units necessary to maintain its strategic nuclear 
deterrent and coastal defense.  Unless there is a dramatic turnaround in the 
Russian economy and a corresponding increase in defense spending, it is 
unlikely that the Russian Navy will ever rival the United States Navy or achieve 
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the goal of a Soviet blue water Navy.   President Putin has made it clear that 
Russia's Navy will be rearmed.  He said last October: "Russia has a program of 
rearmament" and "its implementation will elevate our Navy to a wholly new level." 
(9)  
 
If the Russian Navy is going to be the first Russian armed service that 
successfully reforms into a 21st century force, it does not need to go to a new 
level.  It needs President Putin, Defense Minister Ivanov and Admiral Kuroyedov 
to forget the Soviet blue water Navy and envision a much smaller, jointly 
interoperable Russian naval force.  The acquisition decisions in the next few 
months will be a tell-tale sign as to which option the Russian leadership has 
chosen. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Russian-speakers are still not convinced 
According to the official results, the first round of the presidential elections in 
Ukraine led to a virtual tie between the two main candidates: Viktor Yushchenko 
gained 39.78 percent of the vote and the current Prime-Minister, Viktor 
Yanukovich, 39.32 percent. (1) According to independent exit-polls, however, 
Yushchenko was a clear victor in this tour. Some exit-polls reported an obvious 
landslide in Yushchenko¹s favor. Apparently, Yushchenko¹s lead was large 
enough that the authorities, fearing massive disturbances in the county, did not 
dare present Yanukovich with a clear victory in this round. But they may attempt 
to do so on 21 November – the second round of the elections. 
 
While it is undoubtedly true that Yanukovich and his whole entourage resorted to 
lawless measures in order to assure their ³victory² in the first round; while there 
was massive fraud and intimidations of Ukrainian citizens by Yanukovich¹ 
supporters to vote for him; while there were shameless exclusions of the 
Ukrainian citizens from the voter¹s lists; while is it almost certain that the current 
administration is to blame for the disappearance and murder of an opposition  
journalist, Georgy Gongadze, and an apparent poisoning of Victor Yushchenko; 
while Ukraine¹s economy is in a desperate state; and while Ukrainians realize 
that the current government is extremely corrupt and that their potential president 
is an ex-convict, a large proportion of the population still voted for Yanukovich 
without being forced to do so.  Why? 
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The argument that Ukraine is divided into the Russian-speaking East, which 
seeks some form of federation with Russia, and an Ukrainian-speaking West, 
which is Europe-oriented, may not suffice to explain this phenomenon. Despite 
the sentiment for Mother Russia, it is doubtful that Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
will be willing to trade potential prosperity and stability in Ukraine (should 
Yushchenko become the president and put Ukraine on the path to join EU and 
NATO) for an almost unachievable dream of unification with Russia. However, 
this depends on Yushchenko showing the Russian speakers that he is serious 
about protecting the interests of this very large group. 
 
Although Yushchenko does claim that he does not divide his electorate into 
Russian and Ukrainian speakers and promises to work for the wellbeing of both 
groups, many feel that he was not very successful with getting this message 
across. He may not have achieved enough of that crucial outreach to Russian-
speakers, even if this consists of as little as speaking in Russian occasionally. 
Many Russian-speakers still fear that their children will not being able to 
communicate in proper Russian if the only choice they have is to attend 
Ukrainian schools and universities; they are concerned that Russian will never 
obtain the status of a state language, they are worried of not being able to see a 
movie or a theatre play in Russian. They realize full well that an ex-convict 
Yanukovich is far from being the most desirable candidate, but they still believe 
their life as Russian-speakers will be more assured with him as president. And 
while they also realize that Yushchenko is someone who can open a new chapter 
for Ukraine and put it on the path of economic recovery, they are not sure what 
role they will play in this process. 
 
To be fair, given difficult conditions under which the opposition had to work, it 
was often hard to reach out to its primary voters (Ukrainian-speakers), let alone 
Russian-speakers and there certainly is a fine line between upsetting your clear 
supporters and pleasing potential ones, but the Russian-speaking minority is too 
large not to be targeted more aggressively. Yushchenko needs all possible 
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support when, almost certainly, it will come to contesting the results of the 
second ballot. It is clear that he is a much better candidate when it comes to the 
future of Ukraine and all its peoples but, for some reason, many Russian-
speakers in Ukraine still are not convinced. Yushchenko has ten days to 
persuade them.  
 
BELARUS 
Russian ruble 
The Russian ruble may never become the means of payment in Belarus. Initially, 
the date of its introduction into the Belarusian economy was scheduled for 1 
January, 2005, later it was moved to 1 January, 2006, but even this date seems 
too close to actually making the introduction of the Russian ruble a reality. (2) 
Vladimir Novikov, the First Secretary of Belarusian embassy in Russia explained 
some reasons why Belarus is apprehensive about this step. He expressed 
concern about how Russia would support Belarus in case of economic problems 
there, which could, for example, be caused by a sharp drop in oil prices. He also 
declared that Belarus would expect financial support in case of adoption of the 
Russian currency: ³There (in the EU) all new members receive funds for 
economic adaptation,² stated Novikov. (3) 
 
Referendum results 
As more time elapses since the Belarusian referendum, more information about 
lawless actions by the authorities becomes public. According to the Gallop 
organization exit-poll, only 48.4 percent of the population voted in favor of 
allowing Lukashenko to run for the third term, not the 79.4 percent declared by 
the government. (4) Falsification to the amount of 30 percent is definitely 
substantial (evidently, it was necessary to obtain overwhelming ³support² of the 
population in order to change the constitution). Still, the fact that almost half of all 
Belarusians are happy with Lukashenko and his policies and are willing to solidify 
a dictatorship in the country is astonishing. A not very substantial showing of 
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protesters several days after the elections is a confirmation of this.  Half of 
Belarus may indeed have made a democratic choice – to remain a dictatorship. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Protest in Chisinau 
A group of protesters, which included teachers, parents and students of 
Romanian schools in Transdniestr, as well as the representatives of the 
Moldovan Bureau of the Helsinki Human Rights committee picketed the embassy 
of the Russian Federation in Chisinau last Wednesday. The protesters carried 
posters saying: ³Politicians and criminals, do not involve children into your dirty 
games.² (5) The protesters claimed that the Russian Federation was the only 
country capable of influencing the Dniestr authorities with regard to this issue. 
 
Approximately fifty Romanian schools in Transdniestr, which currently use the 
Cyrillic alphabet, would like to switch back to the Latin alphabet. They reason that 
studying in the so-called ³Moldovan language² might close a lot of doors to 
Transdniestr students, since the Dniestr republic is the only (unrecognized) 
country where this form of language is used. (6) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 10 Nov 04 via (www.pravda.com.ua). 
(2) Charter97 website, 4 Nov 04, via 
(www.charter97.org/rus/news/2004/11/04/rubl). 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Charter97 website, 04 Nov 04, via 
(www.charter97.org/rus/news/2004/11/04/referendum). 
(5) Moldova Azi, 3 Nov 04 via (www.azi.md/news?ID=31572). 
(6) Moldova Azi, 2 Nov 04 via (www.azi.md/news?ID=31554). 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
A month and a half ago, Kazakhstan held elections for the Majlis (lower house). 
The polls resulted in an overwhelming majority for President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev¹s Otan party, and a significant achievement for his daughter Dariga 
Nazarbaeva¹s Asar party. However, according to the OSCE as well as 
Kazakhstan¹s opposition parties, the election was characterized by massive 
fraud and voter intimidation. (1) 
 
Immediately after the results were published, Ak Zhol and Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan announced that they had filed suit with the Kazakh Supreme Court to 
reverse the outcome. (2) Several weeks later, the two parties announced that 
they were holding consultations regarding a possible merger. The purpose of 
such a venture might be to propose a joint candidate to stand against Nazarbaev 
in presidential elections slated for early 2006. (3) It is possible that the exiled 
former Prime Minister, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Nazarbaev¹s vocal critic is 
preparing to propose himself as a candidate. (4) 
 
Most recently, on 27 October, the leadership committee of Ak Zhol held a news 
conference in which it proposed that a nationwide referendum be held in order to 
challenge the election results. The committee, including Altynbek Sarsenbayev 
and Bolat Abilov, proposed six questions for the Kazakh people, regarding 
general reforms of Kazakhstan¹s political system. The question pertaining to the 
elections asked: ³Do you deem it necessary to find the elections to the Majlis of 
parliament unlawful and to initiate new elections?² (5) 
  
 
Although President Nazarbaev probably expected attacks from opposition 
parties, it is likely that dissent from within his own Otan party was surprising and 
unexpected. 
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On 14 October, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, the Speaker of Kazakhstan¹s lower 
house, and Deputy Chairman of President Nursultan Nazarbaev¹s Otan party, 
published an open letter in Vremya, in which he claimed that the elections had 
witnessed ³massive violations of voters¹ rights.² (6) Several days later, on 18 
October, Tuyakbai held a press conference, during which he resigned as 
Speaker. During the press conference, Tuyakbai stated that Nazarbaev should 
find the election result ³illegitimate² and order new elections are held. (7) 
 
On the President¹s behalf, Yermukhamet Yertsbayev, President Nazarbaev¹s 
spokesman and adviser, was quick to respond to these attacks. Speaking to the 
newspaper Respublika on 22 October, Yertsbayev stated that Tuyakbai¹s 
comments should be viewed as nothing more than ³political provocation and 
treason,² and intimated that Tuyakbai was working at the instigation of former 
Information Minister Altynbek Sarsenbayev, rather than being impelled by his 
own convictions. (8) 
 
Early this month, on November 3, Nazarbaev addressed the newly-elected Majlis 
deputies. Nazarbaev told the house that he was ³convinced² that confrontations 
between the various branches of government would serve only to slow the reform 
process. (9) He added that ³you have heard and are hearing all the thoughts and 
opinions regarding parliamentary electionsŠ I believe that from now on, you will 
be responsible yourselves for your words and deeds.² (10) In the context of 
recent events, this statement surely must be viewed as a warning, rather than as 
an attempt at conciliation. It is clear that Nazarbaev and those loyal to him are 
becoming increasingly concerned because the furor over the elections has not 
subsided. Therefore, they are attempting to terminate discussion of the polls so 
that they can move forward with their plans for ³reform,² (11) consolidation of 
power, (12) and the establishment of Nazarbaev¹s daughter as successor once 
the President chooses to retire. 
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Kyrgyzstan elections 
On 26 October, President Askar Akaev gave his traditional annual address to the 
people and parliament of Kyrgyzstan. Akaev¹s speech focused on the lead-up to 
next year¹s Presidential and parliamentary elections. He stated that as a result of 
the events of 1991, Kyrgyzstan had made an ³abrupt turn from authoritarianism 
to democracy.² (13) Akaev noted that the Kyrgyz media have a responsibility to 
³strengthen statehood² instead of provoking ³civil conflict² (14) during the 
forthcoming elections. Finally, the President promised that he would ensure that 
these elections would be in ³complete conformity with the Constitution of the 
country and Elections code.² (15) 
 
President Akaev¹s comments are of interest, not least because of his own 
position. Under the Kyrgyz constitution, as it currently stands, he is forbidden 
from running for the Presidency again. As yet, no clear candidate to replace him 
has emerged, and until this point Akaev has stated that he will not run again. At 
the same time, there is a movement under way in Southern Kyrgyzstan, under 
the auspices of a public fund called ³Elim uchun, elim menen² (for the people, 
together with the people), which is collecting signatures to allow Akaev one more 
term in office. (16) At this point, it is not clear whether the ³fund² is a cover 
organization designed to gauge the public¹s mood on Akaev¹s behalf, or whether 
it is, in fact, a grassroots organization set up legitimately by private citizens. 
 
Kyrgyzstan¹s opposition groups have also been active in recent weeks. A new 
group has emerged in the wake of last month¹s local council elections. Led by 
former Foreign Minister Muratbek Imanaliev and former Finance Minister Sultan 
Meredov, the group, calling itself New Direction has stated that its goals are the 
³revamping of government,² as well as the removal of corruption from politics in 
Kyrgyzstan. (17) As yet, the group has not announced any Presidential 
ambitions. The absence of an announcement now however, does not rule out the 
possibility that the group may propose a candidate in the coming months. 
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Another opposition party, the Popular Patriotic Movement has begun gathering 
signatures for the impeachment of President Akaev. (18) The group claims that 
the initiative has been started because of Akaev¹s failure to remove from office 
the head of the Central Election Commission (Sulaiman Imanbaev) for not 
preventing violations during the October local council elections. (19) 
 
These activities on the opposition¹s part make clear that it does not trust 
President Akaev¹s declared intentions to step down. It remains to be seen 
whether it is correct in that assessment. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX Number 16 (15 October 
2004). 
(2) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX Number 17 (28 October 
2004). 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan in Russian, 1320 GMT, 27 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-
2004-1027 via World News Connection. 
(6) Eurasia Insight, 19 Oct 04 via 
(www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/archives/eav101904_pr.shtml). 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Respublika, 22 Oct 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL, 6 November 04 via 
(www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp110604_prshtml). 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan in Russian, 0541 GMT, 3 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-
2004-1103 via World News Connection. 
(12) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX Number 16 (15 October 
2004) 
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(13) AKIpress News, 26 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(14) RFE/RL Newsline-Transcaucasus & Central Asia, 27 Oct 04 via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(15) AKIpress News, 26 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(16) AKIpress News, 29 Oct 04, via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(17) RFE/RL Newsline-Transcaucasus & Central Asia, 1 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
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